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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIRT OVERSON I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, aka USF&G, 
an insurance company, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Nature of the Case 
No. 15470 
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by Appel-
lant to determine whether a fire loss to a building he was 
constructing was covered by his policy of insurance with 
Respondent. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
This case was tried to a jury, with the Honorable J. Harlan 
Burns presiding. At the conclusion of Appellant's case, the 
court granted Respondent's motion for directed verdict against 
Appellant, finding as a matter of law that the insurance 
policy in question was not ambiguous and that exclusions 
K(3) and (0) of the policy excluded Appellant's loss from 
co'1erase. 
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Relief Sought on Appeal 
Respondent requests that the Judgment below be affirmed. 
Statement of Facts 
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. Appel-
lant's statement of facts is incomplete, however, and therefore, 
a complete recitation of the facts of this case follows. 
On or about August 1, 1973, Appellant purchased a com-
prehensive general liability policy of insurance from Respon-
dent (Tr. p. 3; Exhibit P-1). Said policy of insurance con-
tained certain exclusions which excluded certain types of 
loss from coverage under the policy. Two of these exclusionar; ' 
provisions were relied upon at trial by Respondent. 
Said exclusions read as follows: 
This insurance does not apply: 
* * * 
(k) to property damage to 
* * * 
(3) property in the care, custody 
or control of the Insured or as to 
which the Insured is for any purpose 
exercising physical control; 
* * * 
(o) to property damage to work performed by 
or on behalf of the named Insured arising out 
of the work or any portion thereof, or out of 
materials, parts or equipment furnished in 
connection therewith; (Exhibit P-1). 
-2-
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Neither the policy nor the exclusions were ever read by Appel-
lant. (Tr. p. 8). 
The instant action arises from a fire loss which occurred 
on September 3, 1973. (Tr. p. 4). The building that burned 
was a quonset-type steel building which was to be used for 
potato storage when completed. (Tr. pp. 10, 11; Ex. P-2). 
The owner of the real property upon which the building was 
situated was Triple "C" Farms of McCormack, Utah. (Tr. p. 4). 
At the time of the loss, Triple "C" Farms had not taken pos-
session of the building. (Tr. p. 36). 
The steel for the building, footings and foundations, 
electrical work and some interior ductwork were to be provided 
by Stephenson's, Inc., an implement dealer from Holden, Utah. 
(Tr. pp. 13-15). Appellant had contracted to provide the 
labor necessary to erect the building and to furnish and 
apply the foam insulation used therein. (Tr. pp . 13 , 1 7, 2 0) . 
As of the date of loss, Appellant has no recollection as 
to whether any electrical work or work by persons other than 
him or his employees had been done on the building that burned. 
(Tr. p. 33). He did remember that others had poured the foot-
ings and foundations, but admitted that such work was com-
pleted six or eight weeks prior to the date of loss. (Tr. 
p. 34). On the date of loss, the only persons working on 
or about the building that burned were two employees of 
Appellant, Harold Helgesen and Billie VanDeVanter. (Tr. 
pp. 34, 35, 42, 54). On that day, Messrs. Helgesen and 
-3-
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vanDeVanter had been directed by Appellant to enlarge a 
vented louvre in the ends of the building. (Tr. p. 47). 
They proceeded to accomplish this task by remouing one of 
the metal panels constituting part of the building end wan 
I 
cutting a larger hole in it, replacing the small louvre 
with a larger one and replacing the panel on the building. 
(Tr. pp. 49-51). They had removed the panel from the east 
end of the building without incident but when attempting ~ 
remove the panel from the west end of the building the threads 
on one of the connecting bolts stripped and it could not be 
removed conventionally. (Tr. p. 51). In an effort to remove 
the bolt, Mr. VanDeVanter obtained an acetelyne cutting torch 
from a nearby van and proceeded to cut the head off the 
stripped bolt. (Id.) Before the bolt was severed by the 
torch, the flame ignited the polyurethane foam insulation 
in the building and the building burned to the ground within 
minutes. (Tr. pp. 52, 54). The foam insulation was fur-
nished and applied by Appellanc. (Tr. pp. 1 7, 2 0) . 
Subsequent to the loss, a new building was erected on 
the site. (Tr. p. 29). Thereafter, Stephenson's, Inc. sued 
Appellant for the loss. (Tr. p. 30). Appellant tendered 
defense of that case to Respondent for defense but the te~& 
was refused and coverage denied. (Tr. p. 30). The instant 
action was commenced in the District Court of Millard County 
on October 11, 1974. (R. p. A-1). 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Argument 
POINT I 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF APPELLANT'S 
CASE. 
Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court may direct a verdict for the defen-
dant at the close of the plaintiff's case. It is generally 
held that such a ruling is proper when there is no reason-
able disagreement on the questions to be presented to the 
jury. Boskovich v. Utah Construction co., 123 Utah 387, 259 
P.2d 885 (1953). 
In this case the facts concerning the incident are 
undisputed. 
The only issues remaining were issues of contract inter-
pretation. Those questions could only be decided by the 
trial judge. Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe co. v. Haish 
Utah Corp., 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P.2d 610 (1956). The general 
rule has been stated as follows: 
Interpretation of a written contract is 
usually a question of law for the court. If its 
terms are clear and unambiguous, sununary judgment 
is proper. Even where some ambiguity exists in 
the contract, resolution of the ambiguity is still 
a question of law for the court unless contradic-
tory evidence is presented to clarify the ambigu-
ity. Central Credit Collection Control Corp. v. 
Grayson, 7 Wash. App. 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972) · 
Appellant indicates that because summary judgment had 
previously been denied there must have existed a fact 
-5-
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question. This court ha~ recently held that such i's 
not the 
case. Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., No. 14931, filed 
December 2, 1977. In that case, this court made it clear 
that preliminary rulings do not rise to the level of res 
judicata or stare decisis. Therefore, a directed verdict 
can be properly granted even where summary judgment has been 
denied. 
POINT II 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THE CLAUSES 
OF THE INSURANCE POLICY TO BE CLEAR AND UN-
AMBIGUOUS. 
A. Generally. 
Appellant, in the abstract, claims the exclusionary 
clauses relied upon by Respondent are ambiguous. No specific 
ambiguity is claimed and no specific conflicting interpreta-
tion is advanced by Appellant as being his reading of these 
policy provisions; and indeed, no specifics can be advanced 
by Appellant because he didn't even read the policy. It is 
impossible for Appellant to rely on his interpretation of the 
policy for coverage when he had no interpretation of the 
policy to begin with. In essence, there is no evidence in 
this case of conflicting intent, and there being no such 
evidence, there can be no ambiguity as a matter of law. 
Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc., 518 F.2d 1026 (D.C. cir. 
1973). 
B. Care, Custody or Control. 
Courts have extensively interpreted the provision in 
-6-
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this policy of insurance excluding from coverage of damage 
to property in the care, custody or control of the insured. 
The clause has generally been found to be clear and unambigu-
ous. 62 A.L.R. 2d 1242; Madden v. Vitamilk Dairy, Inc., 367 
P.2d 127 (Wash. 1961); Hill v. United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty, 348 S.W. 2d 512 (Tenn. 1961). In Hill, supra, the 
court stated: 
We think the exclusion clause of the policy 
which provides that said policy does not offer 
indemnity for damage to "property in the care, 
custody or control of property as to which the 
insured for any purpose is exercising control," 
is clear and unambiguous and, as has been stated 
in many cases, the courts will not create an 
ambiguity where none exists. 348 S.W. 2d at 515. 
The case law has developed four rules for determining 
whether the property was within the care, custody or control 
of the insured. They are: First, that possessory, not pro-
prietary, control is required; second, if the property 
damaged is only incidental to the work the insured may not 
have care, custody or control; third, the insured will 
likely have care, custody or control if he has the property 
under his immediate supervision; fourth, care, custody and 
control is more readily found where the property is a neces-
sary element of the work as opposed to being merely incidental. 
62 A.L.R. 2d 1242; Madden v. Vitamilk Dairy, Inc., supra; 
Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, supra. 
In applying those tests to this case, the trier of fact 
-7-
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could only conclude that the plaintiff had care, custody or 
control of the building in question. Appellant had the 
building in his possessory control during its construction 
for a period of six to eight weeks before the fire. The 
building was not merely incidental to the work being done, 
but rather was the sole object of the work. Appellant had 
the building under his immediate supervision. Only his 
employees were working on the building on the day of the 
fire and no significant work had been done by any other 
person during the preceding six to eight weeks. 
Finally, the building was a necessary element of the 
work, indeed it was the only element of the work. 
This Court in American Casualty Co. v. Pearson, 7 Utah 
2d 37, 317 P.2d 954 (1954), adopted the majority view that 
where the damaged property is under the supervision of the 
insured and is a necessary element of the work, the proper~ 
is deemed to be in the care, custody or control of the insured. 
The insured's employee in Pearson, supra, while attaching a 
trailer hitch to a car in the regular course of business of 
the insured' s garage, damaged the automobile when he put a 
welding torch to the gasoline tank. The customer-owner of 
the car was present, observing as well as assisting in the 
progress of the work. This court, nonetheless, held as a 
. d or control 
matter of law that the car was in the care, custo Y 
of the insured's employee; therefore, the insurer was not 
-8-
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liable under the terms of the policy. 
As Appellant points out in his brief, some courts have 
held the care, custody or control exclusion to be ambiguous. 
In analyzing those cases it is apparent that rather than the 
language being ambiguous, the facts of the case present a 
close question when the above tests are applied. For example, 
in Arrigo's Fleet Service, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 54 
Mich. App. 482, 221 N.W. 2d 206 (1974) the plaintiff con-
tracted to repair a broken axle on a large cargo trailer. 
This work did not require access to the cargo area. A fire 
started in the cargo area and the court had to decide whether 
this portion of the trailer was in the plaintiff's care, 
custody or control. Similarly, in Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Haas, 422 S.W. 316 (Mo. 1968) the plaintiff was exter-
minating bugs when an explosion caused damage to the house. 
The court in that case seemed to recognize that in close fact 
situations it would be difficult to decide whether the property 
was in the case, custody or control of the plaintiff. 
These cases indicate that the language of this clause 
is clear and unambiguous and only where the facts present a 
close question have courts resorted to labeling the clause 
ambiguous. In this case, the facts are clear: Appellant 
had the building under his care, custody and control. Indeed, 
it is anomalous for Appellant to claim that the policy was 
ambiguous when he has admitted never reading beyond the cover 
-9-
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page of the policy. 
C. Damage "Arising Out Of" the Work or Materials. 
The policy of insurance also excludes coverage for 
property damage arising out of the work or materials used. 
An excellent case on the subject is Engine Services, Inc. v. 
Reliance Insurance Co., 487 P.2d 474 (Wyo. 1971). In that 
case the plaintiff undertook to rebuild a heavy engine. In 
doing so, the plaintiff's employee improperly installed a 
bearing causing damage to the engine. The plaintiff sought 
coverage under its insurance policy, a policy containing 
language similar to clause (o) in this case. The court there 
,;o1 
denied the relief stating first that the language wa~a~~~ 
ous and thus: 
[I]t has uniformly been held that a lia-
bility policy with an exclusion clause such as 
the present does not insure any obligation of 
the policyholder to repair or replace his own 
defective work or defective product. Quoting, 
Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co., 179 So. 2d 496, 497-498 (La. 
1965). 
487 P.2d at 476. 
In the instant case the loss falls squarely within the 
provisions of this unambiguous exclusion. The damage in 
question was property damage to work performed by the in-
sured (erecting and insulating building) which arose out of 
work done by the insured's employees (cutting bolt and re-
moving louvre) and materials supplied by the insured (foam 
-10-
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insulation) . All of these facts are undisputed. There are 
no issues related to construction or application of this 
provision. Thus, even assuming arguendo that a fact issue 
did exist on the care, custody and control exclusion, appli-
cation of this exclusion would still require a directed ver-
dict against Appellant. 
Under these circumstances the trial judge had no alter-
native but to direct a verdict for Respondent at the close 
of the Appellant's case. 
D. Appellant Purchased the Wrong Insurance 
The very heart of this dispute over coverage is the fact 
that Appellant did not purchase the appropriate policy of 
insurance. The builders risk policy, purchased by contractors 
in similar situations, would have provided coverage for this 
incident. Having failed to purchase the necessary insurance 
he now attempts to obtain extended coverage under the lia-
bility policy previously purchased. 
Conclusion 
The trial court was correct in directing a verdict for 
Respondent at the close of Appellant's case. The facts 
surrounding the incident in question are undisputed. Apply-
ing the language of the policy to the facts of this case, 
only one conclusion could logically be reached. Appellant 
had no insurance coverage for the incident. 
-11-
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~ 
/'Z-DATED this -~ day of April, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Certificate of Service 
nt 
ENSEN & MARTINEAU 
or Respondent 
I hereby certify that on the /,;? t:!- day of April, 1978, 
I personally delivered two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief 
to Philip R. Fishler, Esq., Strong & Hanni, 604 Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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